ABSTRACT Physical-layer security has been widely accepted as the strict notion of perfect secrecy in wireless networks. By exploring the quality gap of the legitimate and wiretap channels, and with the assistance of secure coding, wireless communication can be established between two nodes in the network. Secure connectivity is the key property to describe the networks' ability to establish secure communications. Existing results on a secure graph, which is a model of ad hoc network, are inadequate to fully characterize the properties of infrastructure-based networks. In this paper, we study the secure connectivity of infrastructurebased 1-D networks protected by physical-layer security. The network consists of three types of nodes: powerful nodes (PNs), which are the access points (AP) to the infrastructure and fixed along the network, ordinary nodes (ONs), and eavesdroppers, both of which are Poissonly distributed in the segment bounded by two adjacent PNs. We aim to characterize the secure connections between ONs and PNs in terms of secure connectivity probability (SCP) and secure segment probability (SSP). To obtain the two metrics, we establish an analytical framework by defining secure segments and secure scenarios. Analytical results of SCP and SSP, verified by the simulation experiments, reveal the relations between secure connectivity and system parameters of the infrastructure-based 1-D networks, such as distance between adjacent PNs, distribution density of ONs, and eavesdroppers.
I. INTRODUCTION
Information security is a critical issue for wireless networks. Due to the broadcast nature of wireless links, wireless networks are more vulnerable to attacks and threats. Currently, most security methods rely on cryptographic techniques, including encryption, authentication, access control, etc. In recent years, physical-layer security has been accepted as an anti-eavesdropping technique on communication level. Message confidentiality is guaranteed by secure coding enabled by the capacity gap between different wireless channels [1] - [3] . More practically, physical-layer security can protect significant information exchanges (eg. encryption key) in cryptographic systems, and the security of the network is promoted.
Secure connectivity is one of the fundamental issues of physical-layer security assisted wireless networks. Secure connectivity in ad-hoc stochastic networks has been studied in [4] - [10] . Pinto et al. [4] modeled the large-scale network as a random graph and described local secure connectivity by in-degree and out-degree. Later, they investigated the achievable secrecy rates and the effect of eavesdropper collusion in secure graph in [5] . Then, Pinto and Win [6] analyzed global secure connectivity by percolation approach. Secure graph methods were also used in in ad-hoc networks to study unicast secure connectivity [7] . Goel et al. [8] studied the effect of eavesdroppers with uncertain locations on secure connectivity by means of secure graph. Yang et al. [9] studied secure connectivity of large-scale networks, and showed the impact of eavesdroppers' density on secure connectivity in colluding and non-colluding scenarios. Artificial noise aided multiple antenna techniques enabled a series of effective methods of enhancing secure connectivity for wireless networks. Zhou et al. [11] studied local secure connectivity of wireless random networks with multi-antenna transmission, and designed two techniques to improve secure connectivity by forming a directional antenna or using eigen-beamforming. Directional modulation by antenna array, which improves transmission security by projecting signals into a predetermined spatial direction, has also been attracting growing interest [12] - [14] . Recently, secure connectivity study has been extended to random cellular networks [15] , [16] . Reference [15] studied physical-layer security in heterogeneous cellular networks. In such networks, mobile users were first associated to a BS. Connection probability and user secrecy probability were defined with respect to user's and eavesdropper's signal-tointerference-plus-noise ratios (SINRs).
The aforementioned researches are only applicable to ad-hoc networks with no infrastructure. However, real networks often adopt infrastructure-based design to obtain Internet access and control centers. In infrastructure-based networks, fixed powerful nodes (PN) function as base stations (BSs) or access points (APs). Ordinary nodes (ON) are randomly distributed and exchange confidential information with the infrastructure via PNs with the assistance of secure coding. A typical example is vehicular networks in which vehicles communicate with roadside units (RSUs). Another application is wireless sensor network deployed into 1-D structure for certain purposes, where PNs are data sinks collecting data from sensors and sending control information to them, e.g. sensor network along a river for environment monitoring. Connectivity without security requirement in vehicular networks has been investigated in the literature [17] - [22] . Especially, authors of [23] considered connectivity without security requirement in 1-D networks and defined that a network is type-II connected if all ONs in the network are connected to at least one PN.
In this paper, we consider infrastructure-based onedimensional (1-D) networks consisting of PNs, ONs and eavesdroppers, all of which are distributed on a straight line. In such networks, ONs exchange information with PNs via ON-to-infrastructure (N2I) communications and with other ONs via ON-to-ON (N2N) communications. The secure connection between ONs and the infrastructure can be established within one hop or two hops. Meanwhile, multiple independent eavesdroppers keep wiretapping the wireless channels. In such networks, PNs play an important role in collecting and disseminating information from/to ONs. Therefore, secure connectivity between ONs and the infrastructure is of primary significance. To characterize secure connectivity more comprehensively, we study two types of secure connectivity. The first type characterizes the existence of secure connection between an arbitrary ON and the infrastructure. The other type characterizes the connection between the infrastructure and all ONs within a segment. We develop a framework to analyze the probabilities of the above two types of connectivity, namely secure connectivity probability (SCP) and secure segment probability (SSP).
Secure connectivity analysis for infrastructure-based 1-D networks is different from aforementioned connectivity analysis without secure coding. Secure connectivity is associated with both ONs and eavesdroppers, which are distributed independently. The existence of multiple eavesdroppers and their random distribution further complicate the analysis of secure connectivity. Secure connectivity analysis for infrastructure-based networks is also different from stochastic networks. In stochastic networks, all nodes are regarded as identical and equal entities. Therefore, the analytical method is applicable to secure connection between any two nodes. In infrastructure-based networks, N2I communication requires secure connection between an ON and the entire infrastructure, which means that the ON need to be connected to only PNs. Moreover, downlink and uplink secure connectivities need to be discussed separately since the eavesdropper channels are from different types of nodes. To derive the expressions of SCPs and SSPs for infrastructurebased 1-D networks, we develop a set of theoretical tools and an analytical framework. To be specific,
• Defining a series of secure segments: we define secure segments for N2I and N2N communications, within which any ON has secure connection with PNs or another ON. Secure segments help analyzing SCP/SSP and reveal the features of secure networks. They can also be used in many other researches on secure networks.
• Analyzing secure scenarios: we analyze scenarios where 1-hop and 2-hop uplink/downlink connectivity may exist, and describe the scenarios with secure segments. This can facilitate the derivation of SCP/SSP and draw valuable conclusions.
• Calculating mechanism: we express the events of secure connection with secure segments for each secure scenario and calculate SCP/SSP results according to the laws of Poisson distribution. This is the last important step of analyzing SCP/SSP and can be extended to calculations of more metrics in infrastructure-based networks. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II describes system model and defines secure connection. In Section III and Section IV, we respectively calculate SCPs and SSPs for uplink/downlink connections. Analytical and simulation results are presented in Section V. Section VI concludes the paper and reveals future works.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider an infrastructure-based 1-D network consisting of PNs, ONs and eavesdroppers. PNs are fixed along the network and the Euclidean distance between any two adjacent PNs is L. The group of ONs is modeled as Poisson distribution with density λ o . In the network, there also exist multiple passive eavesdroppers which keep wiretapping wireless channels. The eavesdroppers also follow Poisson distribution with density λ e . System model is illustrated in Fig. 1 . The probability that there are n ONs or eavesdroppers on a segment with length x is given by
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The analysis of secure connectivity is based on the unit segment bounded by two adjacent PNs. Without loss of generosity, we let the left PN of the segment, labeled as PN1, be original point, and the coordinate of the right PN, labeled as PN2, be L. The coordinate of any ON or eavesdropper on the segment is its Euclidean distance from PN1. ONs exchange information with PNs via N2I communications. ONs that cannot be connected to PNs directly will find another ON as relay and complete N2I communication in two hops. Now, we define some important notations used in this paper. o and e denote the set of all ONs and the set of all eavesdroppers on the considered segment. x i − x j is the Euclidean distance between nodes at x i and x j . (x i , x j ) is the segment bounded by nodes at x i and x j . N (x i , x j ) and M(x i , x j ) are the numbers of ONs and eavesdroppers on segment (x i , x j ).
We assume that the wireless channels experience large scale path loss with attenuation constant c and path loss exponent α. Suppose that the transmitter, legitimate receiver and the kth eavesdropper are at x i , x j and e k . The signalto-noise-ratio (SNR) of the legitimate receiver is SNR j = Here, P i is the transmit power and σ 2 is the noise power. Orthogonal medium access control (MAC) protocol is assumed, so that no interference occurs at receivers. Using physical-layer security techniques, secrecy rate is given by
where
Here, e * = arg min
It denotes the coordinate of the eavesdropper closest to the transmitter at x i . k belongs to a realization of eavesdropper set on the related segment. A secure connection from x i to x j is defined as [4] 
where is a threshold representing the minimum secrecy rate for a secure connection. SCP is thus defined as Pr(R s (x i , x j ) > ). This work considers = 0, which means that secure connection is possible if secrecy rate is positive. The condition that the link from x i to x j is secure is given by
The case that the number of eavesdropper is 0 will be discussed separately.
III. ANALYSIS OF SECURE CONNECTIVITY PROBABILITY
First, we denote p m (x) as the SCP of an arbitrary ON whose coordinate is x. The ON is allowed to get access to PNs directly or via a relay ON. Thus, p m (x) can be expressed as
Here, m = u denotes uplink and m = d denotes downlink. p m1 (x) is 1-hop SCP, the probability that the ON can be connected to at least one PN directly. p m2 (x) is 2-hop SCP, the probability that the ON can be connected to at least one PN via exactly two hops. The overall SCP is averaged among all possible ONs in the segment and is expressed as [18] 
In order to reveal the features of secure connectivity and to analyze SCP more conveniently, we define secure and insecure segments as follows.
• S b : secure segment of uplink/downlink N2I connection.
S b is the set of all possible locations on which an ON has secure uplink/downlink connection to at least one PN directly.
• S o (x): secure segment of uplink/downlink N2N connection from/to the ON at x. S o (x) is the set of all possible locations on which a ON has secure connection from/to the ON at x directly. The event that the ON has direct connection with PNs is equivalent to x ∈ S b . 2-hop connectivity is equivalent to x ∈ S b and that at least one ON exists in S b ∩ S o (x). Then, we obtain
Note that (8) holds under the assumption that securing each hop individually is sufficient to secure the multihop connection. Thus, relay protocols need to be discussed before (8) is used for calculating p m2 . When amplifyand-forward (AF) or decode-and-forward (DF) protocol is adopted and eavesdroppers do not combine signals from the two hops, ON SNR should be greater than eavesdropper SNR in each hop. When different codebooks are used in DF relaying, eavesdroppers can only decode signals individually [24] . In above scenarios, (8) can be adopted. When eavesdroppers combine signals in AF protocol or DF protocol using single codebook, (8) cannot be adopted to calculate p m2 . Furthermore, if randomize-and-forward (RF) protocol is used, which adds independent randomness to each hop, multihop secure connectivity just requires securing each hop and (8) 
where e min = min k∈ e e k and e max = max k∈ e e k . Proof: From (4), the condition for uplink 1-hop connectivity from x to PN1 is given by
which can be further transformed to
If x > e * , (10) cannot be satisfied. Then, we deduce that e * = e min . The conditions for uplink 1-hop connectivity from x to PN2 is
which can be transformed to
Then, we draw the conclusions that e * = e max . Inferred from above discussions, the insecure segment caused by a single eavesdropper at e is obtained as ( Proof: Concluded from the proof of Lemma 1, ONs connected to PN1 should satisfy x < e * , and ONs connected to PN2 should satisfy x > e * . This corollary is proved following above assertions.
Lemma 2: Uplink N2N secure segment of an arbitrary ON located at x is given by
Proof: This lemma can be derived from (4) . If the transmission from the ON at x to the ON at x j is secure, we get
x − e k .
All possible values of x j form uplink N2N secure segment. Secure and insecure segments can help describing secure connectivity and simplifying the calculation of probabilities. 1-hop SCP can be calculated in the following proposition.
Proposition 1: Uplink 1-hop SCP of an ON located at x is given by
Proof: 1-hop SCP can be derived from (7) and Lemma 1 by the following steps.
The special case that M(0, L) = 0 has been covered by (13) . Then, Lemma 1 is proved.
Observed from the result of (13), 1-hop SCP is the function of only eavesdropper density, and is not affected by ON density. This indicates that the network can tolerate high ON density in terms of secure connectivity. In the remaining part of this section, we analyze 2-hop SCP.
Corollary 1 indicates that eavesdroppers cannot appear on both sides of the ON. Thus, 2-hop connectivity can only be achieved in the following two scenarios:
• Scenario 1: all eavesdroppers appear on (x, L);
• Scenario 2: all eavesdroppers appear on (0, x). Analysis of 2-hop SCP is conducted with respect to the two scenarios.
Proposition 2:
(14)
Proof: Let y 1 , ..., y k denote the Euclidean distances between the node at x and each eavesdropper on (x, L). So the coordinate of the closest eavesdropper is x + y 1 .
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For Scenario 1, S b = (0,
Given that there are k Poisson distributed points on a line l meters long, the probability density function (PDF) of y 1 is [25]
Averaging p u2,1 (x, k) with respect to y 1 and substituting limits of integral, we obtain that
Applying the properties of Poisson distribution, this proposition is proved.
Proof: The proof for Scenario 2 is similar to Scenario 1. y 1 , ..., y k are the Euclidean distances between the ON and each eavesdropper on (0, x). The coordinate of the eavesdropper that is closest to the ON is y k . For Scenario 2, the secure and insecure segments are given by
we give the following derivations.
Given that there are k points on a line with length of l, the PDF of y k is [25] 
Averaging p u2,2 (x, k) with respect to y k and following Poisson distribution, (18) is proved. When M(0, L) = 0, all ONs on the segment have direct connection to PNs, so we do not need to discuss this case separately. Following the law of total probability, uplink 2-hop SCP of ON at x is given by
Substituting (12) and (21) into (5) and (6), uplink SCP is obtained.
B. DOWNLINK SECURE CONNECTIVITY PROBABILITY

Downlink transmission refers to the communication from one of the two PNs to an ON within (0, L). 2-hop downlink transmission is comprised by communication from a PN to a relay ON within (0, L)
, and communication from the relay to the ON. Similar to uplink transmission, 2-hop secure connectivity requires secure connection in each hop. Different from uplink transmission, eavesdroppers listening to the downlink messages are distributed in (0, L) and its two adjacent segments. Thus, the basic model for analysis is the large segment (−L, 2L) composed of three consecutive unit segments. The ON is located in the middle segment and e includes all eavesdroppers on the large segment. Lemma 3: Downlink N2I secure segment of (0, L) is given by
Proof: From (4), the condition of downlink secure connectivity from PN1 to the ON at x is
Here, e * = arg min k∈ e e k , which is the coordinate of the eavesdropper closest to PN1. Secure connectivity from PN2 to the node at x requires
where e * = arg min k∈ e L − e k . Confining the receiving ON in the segment of (0, L), this lemma is proved.
Lemma 4: Downlink N2N secure segment of an arbitrary ON at x is given by
where e * 1 = arg min e k ∈(−L,x)
x − e k and e * 2 = arg min e k ∈(x,2L) e k − x. Proof: First, we assume that M(0, x) = M(x, L) = 1. The coordinates of the two eavesdroppers are e 1 and e 2 . From (4), we write that the condition of downlink secure connectivity from the ON at x i to another ON at x is
Extend above analysis to multiple eavesdroppers case and we get
2 .
Now, this lemma is proved. Proposition 4: Downlink 1-hop SCP is given by
Proof: According to (7) and Lemma 3,
Then, (24) is derived following Poisson distribution. To achieve 2-hop connectivity, x ∈ S b requires that eavesdroppers appear on both (−x, x) and (x, 2L − x). Meanwhile, N (S o (x)) > 0 indicates that at least one of (0, x) and (x, L) has zero eavesdropper. Then, 2-hop downlink secure connectivity can be achieved in the following three scenarios.
• Scenario 1 (connectivity from both PNs):
• Scenario 2 (connectivity from only PN1):
• Scenario 3 (connectivity from only PN2): 
Proof: Let y 1 , ..., y k 1 denote the Euclidean distances separated by the point at −x and each eavesdropper on (−x, 0) and z 1 , ..., z k 2 denote the Euclidean distances separated by PN2 and each eavesdropper on (L, 2L − x). Then the secure segments of Scenario 1 are expressed as
It is obvious that Scenario 1 already satisfies that x ∈ S b , Note that S b consists of two parts, each one of which is associated with one PN. Moreover, downlink connections from two PNs to the ON are independent. Then, we have
q 1 is the connectivity probability from PN1 and q 2 is the connectivity probability from PN2. Then, we obtain
This proof is complete. 
Proof: In Scenario 2 and Scenario 3, ON can establish secure connections from PN1 and PN2, respectively. VOLUME 6, 2018
Directly using the results of Proposition 5, SCPs of Scenario 2 and Scenario 3 are given by p d2,2 (x, k 1 ) = q1 and p d2,3 (x, k 2 ) = q2.
Summing up the results of all three scenarios and following the law of total probability, downlink 2-hop SCP of an arbitrary ON is given by (29), as shown at the top of this page. Substituting (24) and (29) into (5) and (6), downlink SCP is obtained.
IV. ANALYSIS OF SECURE SEGMENT PROBABILITY
SSP is defined as the probability that all ONs on the unit segment have secure connectivity to the infrastructure. In other words, all ONs can be connected to either PN via at most two hops. ONs distributed in S b can be securely connected to PNs directly. Challenges come from the ONs that lie outside S b but can communicate with PNs via exactly two hops. To help investigating the ONs outside S b , we define 2-hop N2I secure segment as
S b2 is the coordinate set of ONs that can be possibly connected to PNs via two hops. A secure segment requires the following two conditions to be satisfied simultaneously: all ONs are located in S b ∪ S b2 ; each one of ONs in S b2 can find at least one relay in S b . Additionally, as is discussed in Corollary 1, the basic requirement of secure segment is N (e min , e max ) = 0. Thus, when M(0, L) ≥ 2, a zero-node area appears between the far left and far right eavesdroppers. If a segment is secure, it should first satisfy the following two basic requirements:
• N (e min , e max ) = 0: none of the ONs is blocked by eavesdroppers;
• N S b2 ∪ S b = 0: all ONs should appear in 1-hop or 2-hop secure segments.
A. UPLINK SECURE SEGMENT PROBABILITY
We notice that secure segment requires that all ONs should appear on (0, e min ) or (e max , L). 2-hop N2I secure segment of uplink communications is given by
ONs in S b can directly connect to PNs and do not need further discussion. We focus on the ONs located in S b2 while guaranteeing that no eavesdroppers appear outside S b ∪ S b2 . If each one of ONs in S b2 can find a reachable relay in S b , this segment is secure. According to the total number of eavesdroppers on (0, L), the analysis of SSP considers three cases as follows.
If no eavesdroppers appear on the segment, all ONs can be connected to both PNs directly. SSP is given by 
As long as the k 1 -th ON can find a relay, i.e. N (2x k l ,
2 ) > 0, each ON can find a relay that helps it connect to PN1. The probability that all ONs in ( 
Analysis of ( + z i . Relays might be found in the following area given by
The probability that all nodes in (
Combining the secure probabilities of the two parts of S b2 with the basic requirement that N S b2 ∪ S b = 0, SSP of Case 2 is obtained by the law of total probability, which is calculated as follows:
In this case, e min = e max = y and
. It is a special case of Case 2 and analyzing it is similar to Case 2 with following modifications.
and
Averaged among all possible value of y, SSP of Case 3 is
Summing up probabilities of the above three cases, uplink SSP is obtained.
B. DOWNLINK SECURE SEGMENT PROBABILITY
We derive two-hop N2I secure segment for downlink connection when M(0, L) ≥ 2. The first requirement for secure segment is N (y 1 , y k ) = 0. Downlink 2-hop N2I secure segment is given by
When M(0, L) = 0 or 1, the zero-node area no longer exists. The two parts of S b2 may overlap, and even S b2 and S b may also overlap. Consequently, the analysis of SSP would become tanglesome classified discussions. So we only consider eavesdroppers on (0, L) and compute a upperbound for SSP by neglecting eavesdroppers on (−L, 0) ∪ (L, 2L).
If M(0, L) = 0 or 1, all ONs in the segment can securely receive downlink messages from PNs. Thus,
If M(0, L) ≥ 2, the N2I secure segment is expressed as
ONs in S b cannot securely receive messages from any PN via any number of relays. Hence, as long as M(y 1 , y k ) = 0 is satisfied, this segment is secure. SSP is calculated as
Downlink SSP is obtained by summing up the results of the above two cases.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
We illustrate analytical and simulation results for SCPs and SSPs of the considered 1-D network. In simulation experiments, 10000 realizations of Poisson distributed nodes are generated on an unit segment with length L. To show the impact of node density on SCPs and SSPs, three sets of density parameters (λ o , λ e ) are considered: (0.01, 0.001), (0.05, 0.001) and (0.01, 0.002). Fig. 2(a) , 2(b) and 2(c) show uplink SCPs with respect to L under the three sets of density parameters. The analytical and simulation results match each other and our theoretical analysis is validated. The first important observation is that 1-hop SCPs of all density sets decrease with L, which can be proved by (12) . 2-hop SCPs of all density sets increase in small L region and then decease as L gets larger. This is because when L is small, an ON can be easily connected to PNs directly, so it does not need a relay. As L gets larger, ONs might be located farther away from PNs and 2-hop SCP rises. When L is too large, the node may be out of 2-hop be shown in (12) . ON density only affects the existence of relay nodes and is the parameter of 2-hop SCP. With density parameter set (0.01, 0.002), all SCPs in 2(c) are obviously lower than 2(a) due to heavier eavesdropper density. Eavesdropper density determines the secure segments and thus affects both 1-hop and 2-hop SCPs. Higher eavesdropper density squeezes secure segments, resulting in lower SCPs. In Fig. 3(a) , 3(b) and 3(c), downlink SCPs of the three density sets are depicted. The curves of downlink SCPs have similar patterns as their uplink counterparts in Fig. 2 . ON density and eavesdropper density have the same impact on downlink SCPs as uplink SCPs. Fig. 4 shows how uplink SSPs of the three density sets change with L. All SSP curves are monotonically decreasing with L, which suggests that the distance between two adjacent PNs should not be too long. The rise of λ o from 0.01 to 0.05 causes only slight drop of SSP. Although higher λ o can raise the probability of finding relays, it also raises the average number of ONs, so probability of finding at least one ON without secure connectivity rises. Moreover, λ o only affects 2-hop SCP, which is much lower than 1-hop SCP. Hence, SSP changes slightly, especially in large L region. When λ e increases from 0.001 to 0.002, it becomes more difficult to guarantee secure connection for all ONs.
In Fig. 5 , we show downlink SSPs discussed in Section IV-B. Similar to uplink SSPs, downlink SSPs of (0.01,0.001) and (0.05,0.001) are close to each other, and they drop with the growing of L in an approximately linear manner. Raising λ e from 0.001 to 0.002 yields an evident reduction of SSP compared with (0.01,0.001) and (0.05,0.001), because the secure segments shrink as the eavesdropper density grows. The curve of (0.01,0.002) is convex and monotonically decreasing with L. We notice that raising λ o from 0.01 to 0.05 causes reduction of both uplink and downlink SSP and the reduction is only slight. This suggests that when eavesdropper density is relatively stable, the infrastructure-based 1-D network can tolerate high ON density without evident loss of SSP. On the contrary, eavesdropper density has great impact on SSP, because the secure and insecure segments are determined by statistical features of eavesdroppers' random distribution. Higher eavesdropper density leads to smaller secure segments. Hence, to control eavesdroppers' density is an efficient method to guarantee SSP performance.
Finally, we compare SCP with access probability of log-normal model analyzed in [17] . It is observed from [17, Fig. 9 ] that when L is smaller than the turning point, access probability without eavesdroppers is almost 1, which means that when BSs are close enough to each other, nodes can always access the infrastructure. However, SCP does not benefit from small inter-BS distance and declines consistently when L grows from 0 to 5000. Similar conclusions can be drawn from the comparison of SSP and connectivity probability discussed in [17] . The existence of random eavesdroppers is accounted for the differences.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we investigated secure connectivity for infrastructure-based 1-D networks where both ONs and eavesdroppers are randomly distributed on the segments bounded by PNs. SCP and SSP are considered as performance metrics of characterizing secure connectivity of the considered network. To calculate uplink/downlink SCP and SSP, we defined secure and insecure segments for N2I and N2N connections. Then, we analyzed the scenarios for secure connections and described these scenarios with respect to secure and insecure segments. The analytical results of SCPs and SSPs are derived by using statistical methods. Simulations verify our analysis and show how key factors of the considered network affect connectivity performance. To be specific, ON density does not affect 1-hop SCP, and causes limited fluctuation of 2-hop SCP. Thus, ON density has negligible impact on SCP. On the contrary, the rising of eavesdropper density can clearly reduce uplink/downlink SCPs. Uplink/downlink SSPs are mainly affected by eavesdropper density and higher ON density only causes slight drop of SSP. We can draw the conclusion that, under the considered transmission protocols and in terms of secure connectivity, the infrastructure-based 1-D network is able to tolerate high ON density, and controlling eavesdropper density is the key factor to guarantee secure connectivity performance. In future works, we may consider non-orthogonal MAC protocols which will lead to interference. Moreover, secure connectivity with directional modulation is also worth investigating. VOLUME 6, 2018 
